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Executive summary 
Most prior studies suggest that firms opportunistically increase their earnings around an 
initial public offering (IPO). With a sample of 512 IPOs in 24 countries worldwide I find that 
IPO firms that are under suspicion of such behaviour, represent only a small proportion 
(+/-10%) of the total sample. My findings challenge the opportunistic perspective on 
earnings management and suggest that the information perspective is more pronounced. 
Furthermore, I find no evidence for a positive relationship between low investor protection 
regulations and opportunistic earnings management. It seems that stronger enforcement of 
investor protection laws do not counter self-interested behaviour.   
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Earnings management received more and more attention in the accounting literature. In 
the context of initial public offerings (IPOs) most researchers found pervasive evidence for 
earnings management (Friedlan 1994; Teoh et al. 1998, 1998a; Roosenboom et al. 2003; 
Pastor and Poveda 2006). They explain that IPO firms (also shortened as IPOs) use their 
managerial discretion to increase earnings. Researchers interpreted the evidence by 
suggesting that these income increasing activities are driven by opportunistic behaviour. 
IPOs are particularly liable to such behaviour because both incentives and possibilities are 
offered around the IPO process. An important incentive for IPOs is to achieve high offer 
prices when offering their shares to the public. Possibilities for opportunistic earnings 
management exist, because there is an unusually high level of information asymmetry 
around that time. Managers have the possibility to choose accounting methods that benefit 
their own interest. For investors it is difficult to access if those accounting methods reflect 
the true economic performance. (Ahmad-Zaluki et al. 2007, 1) 
 
Recently Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 30-32) doubted the evidence in IPO earnings 
management research. First, they did not found pervasive evidence of earnings 
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management in their study on the U.K. market. Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007, 31) stated that 
differences in pervasive earnings management evidence, can be the result of different 
environmental and company specific factors. For example, they found that earnings 
management is only pervasive in a period of an economic stress (East Asia crisis of 1997 
and 1998). Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 32) secondly stipulated that the appearance of 
discretionary accruals (which are frequently used as indicators of earnings management) is 
not caused by managerial self-interest, but by working capital changes that are 
endogenous to IPOs. Therefore they supported the “information perspective” on earnings. 
This perspective explains that managers have the opportunity to use their discretion 
(judgements and estimates), to manage earnings to a level that reflect the firms’ true 
economic performance4. In this scenario investors face fewer costs, because they do not 
have to search for additional information from other sources. 
 
Based on a sample of 512 companies that went public from 2001 to 2004 on worldwide 
stock markets, this positive accounting research presents new evidence regarding these 
debates. This paper first re-examines the extent of IPOs that engage in income increasing 
earnings management5. This paper re-examines the subjects with a more recent sample 
and with better accrual estimating models, compared with most prior research. Second, 
with reference to Ball and Shivakumar (2006), this paper re-examines on the basis of three 
conditions the extent of IPOs that are under suspicion of opportunistic earnings 
management. The three conditions are: 
 
1) Significantly positive discretionary accruals and exceptionally high earnings in excess of 
operating cash flow, in the year that earnings management is applied. 
2) Negative discretionary accruals and exceptionally low earnings in post-earnings 
management periods. 
3) Exceptionally inferior operating performance in post-earnings management periods. 
 
Re-examining both these subjects is necessary, because criticism like Ball and Shivakumar 
(2006) showed that present evidence is far from unequivocal. New evidence will shed more 
light on the pervasiveness of earnings management in general and of opportunistic 
behaviour specifically. 
 
Third, in continuation of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007, 31) who advised for further 
investigations about environmental and company factors, this paper examines the 
relationship between investor protection regulations and earnings management. This paper 
also examines if these regulations constrain opportunistic behaviour. To the author’s best 
knowledge, are these investigations unique in the IPO context. 
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Insight in the above mentioned subjects accesses in which extent earnings management 
may be detrimental to investors and other stakeholders, and in which extent investor 
protection regulations constrain managerial self-interested behaviour. Information about 
these subjects helps standards to determine how much discretion should be given to 
managers and whether new disclosures or standards are required, or whether existing 
standards can be maintained. It helps issuing firms about how discretionary accruals affect 
the post-issue performance, and might affect the cost of equity. And it helps investors and 
other stakeholders to distinguish IPOs that engage in earnings management, by analysing 
their accruals and financial position. (Teoh et al. 1998, 202-203; Healy and Wahlen 1999, 
3) 
 
The above mentioned research subjects lead to the following research question: 
 
“Do firms engage in income increasing earnings management based on accruals around 
IPOs? If yes, what is the extent of firms that are under suspicion of opportunistic 
behaviour? What is the relationship between investor protection regulations and earnings 
management around IPOs? And are there indications that these regulations constrain 
opportunistic behaviour?” 
 
To answer the research question this paper first describes in section 2, how earnings 
management is defined and what accruals are. It then describes which motivations IPOs 
may have to engage in earnings management. Section 2 provides also a briefly literature 
study and shows how this paper contributes to prior literature. The section ends with 
explaining the relation between earnings management and investor protection regulations. 
Section 3 describes the hypothesises that are formed and the sample selection and data. It 
also describes how earnings management is measured in this paper. The results and 
analyses of the empirical research are provided in section 4. This section explains these 
results with expectations, and with conclusions from prior research. It also gives 
suggestions for further research. Section 5 stipulates the conclusions of this paper. 
 
 
2.  Prior literature 
 
2.1  Earnings management around IPOs 
Schipper (1989, 92) defined earnings management as “A purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. 
Accrual accounting is one of the methods that managers have to engage in earnings 
management6. This paper focuses on this method. Accruals are the differences between a 
periods’ earnings and cash flows. Accruals can be split up into non-discretionary accruals 
and discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are determined by managers. Non-
discretionary accruals are imposed by the situation and the sector in which a firm is acting, 
by the scale of the firm, by the total net revenue and by the value of the assets. Most 
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researchers use significantly positive discretionary accruals as an indicator for earnings 
management. (Teoh et al. 1998, 203; Mohanram 2003, 5) 
 
Ritter (1998, 5) defined an IPO as: “An IPO occurs when a security is sold to the general 
public for the first time, with the expectation that a liquid market will develop”. There 
are some explanations why IPOs engage in earnings management. Most of the following 
explanations are related with opportunistic earnings management, not with informative. 
Firstly, there is pressure from key players in the IPO process to report favorable earnings, 
for example from the underwriter and underwriting investment bankers.  Secondly, the 
‘lock-up’ period offers an incentive. When managers want to sell their shares with a 
maximum profit after the lock-up period, they have the incentive to maintain high 
earnings after the issuing. Thirdly, the reliability of the investors offers an incentive. 
Investment bankers make predictions for the future. The firm wants to obtain these 
predictions to avoid a decline in the confidentiality of the investors. Investment bankers 
also desire that shares are fully subscribed and that the price has a sufficient level. These 
aspects are important when firms want to do a secondary equity offering. Finally, when 
earnings decline rapidly immediately after the firm goes public, this usually leads to a 
rapid decline in share prices. This decline may result in lawsuits between the firm and 
discontented shareholders. An explicit incentive for informative earnings management is to 
provide high financial reporting quality. The role of external financial reporting is to 
“portray differences in firms’ economic positions and performance in a timely and 
credible manner” (Healy and Wahlen 1999, 1). Informative earnings management may 
therefore be sufficient for parties that use financial reporting for contracting purposes and 
for investment decision making. (Teoh et al. 1998, 179; Roosenboom et al. 2003, 3; Li et 
al. 2006, 4) 
 
When firms want to influence the firms’ earnings they have three timing possibilities. 
Figure 1 shows these timing possibilities: the pre-IPO period (years -1, -2, etc), the IPO 
year (year 0) and the subsequent years (year 1, 2, etc). 
 
Figure 1 - The timeline of IPOs 
        Lock-up     Year 0’s 
               IPO     period    earnings are 
              date      ends      announced       
       
                    Time 
 
 Fiscal year -1  Fiscal year 0  Fiscal year +1         Fiscal year +2 
 Pre-IPO  During IPO           Post-IPO 
 
 
Friedlan (1994) and Neill et al. (1995) found evidence for earnings management in the pre-
IPO period. On the other hand, Aharony et al. (1993), Roosenboom et al. (2003, 21) and 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 30) also examined the years before the IPO but found no 
evidence. Teoh et al. (1998, 203) examined if IPOs use accruals to increase earnings during 
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the IPO year. They investigated a sample of 1,649 U.S. IPOs and found that the median net 
income of the most aggressive quintile (highest discretionary accruals) are positive in the 
year of the IPO and decreases, to become zero in the fourth year after IPO. The operating 
cash flow is negative in the year of the IPO and increases in the subsequent periods. The 
net income of the more conservative quintiles decreases, but stabilise more and move 
upwardly. Teoh et al. (1998, 203) interpreted these patterns that managers use 
discretionary accruals driven by self-interest behaviour, to increase reported earnings in 
the period during the IPO. Other researchers strengthened this conclusion (Roosenboom et 
al. 2003, 23; Pastor and Poveda 2006, 25). Bajor (2002) focussed on the post-IPO period. 
He selected 190 U.S. firms that issued an IPO in 1995 and found significantly positive 
discretionary accruals in year +1. He stated that managers increase income driven by self-
interest. Similar results were found by Teoh et al. (1998, 1998a). 
 
To summarise, most researchers found evidence for pervasive earnings management during 
and after the IPO. However, recently Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 30-32) had several 
concerns about these studies, especially about the Teoh et al. (1998, 1998a) studies 
(Ahmad-Zaluki 2007, 7). Firstly, they found bias in the study of Teoh et al. (1998a) and 
therefore concluded that parts of the evidence of the study of Teoh et al. (1998a) were 
unreliable. Secondly, Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 30) did not found evidence for income 
increasing earnings management. They only found conservative figures7. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006, 32) also argued that in cases that discretionary accruals appear, this is 
not the result of earnings management but a result of working capital changes, which is 
endogenous to an IPO. They stipulated that in events like IPOs, firms usually adjust their 
working capital automatically. One reason that firms are going public is to unburden a 
resources constrain. This means that IPOs seems to have under-invest in inventory and 
receivables in pre-IPO periods, and use the IPO to relieve these constrains. In addition, 
IPOs seems to have over-use trade credit and other operating liabilities. Both those assets 
and liabilities are identified as “income increasing discretionary accruals” by Teoh et al. 
(1998, 1998a), but Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 32) identified those assets and liabilities as 
working capital changes which are endogenous to IPO proceeds. Finally Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006, 32) stated that IPOs do not opportunistically manage their earnings but 
provide higher quality financial information, demanded by public investors (the 
information perspective). This conclusion was strengthened by Fan (2007, 1), who stressed 
that earnings management could result in considerable costs for IPOs. He stated that most 
IPO´s have no incentives to use earnings management once it exceeds the point of being 
informative. They would only manage earnings to a level that expresses the real future 
performance of the firm. 
 
2.2 The contribution of this paper 
Criticism of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) showed that evidence on the pervasiveness of 
earnings management, opportunistic behaviour specifically, is far from unequivocal. In 
order to shed more light on this issue, this paper will first re-examine the extent of IPOs 
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that engage in earnings management. It performs the investigations with a more recent 
sample (21st century) and with better accrual estimating models8. This paper uses 
significantly positive discretionary accruals as indicator for earnings management, which is 
consistent with prior research (Teoh et al. 1998, 203; Roosenboom et al. 2003). Secondly, 
based on three conditions, this paper re-examines the extent of IPOs that are under 
suspicion of opportunistic earnings management behaviour. These IPOs should meet all the 
following three conditions to be under suspicion: 
 
1. Discretionary accruals in the year of earnings management are significantly positive and 
earnings are, compared with other IPOs, exceptionally highly in excess of operating cash 
flow.  
This paper assumes that in these situations discretionary accruals are used to manage 
earnings by a considerable increment. 
2. Discretionary accruals in post-earnings management periods are negative and earnings 
are, compared with other IPOs, exceptionally low.  
This paper assumes that in these situations the decline in earnings is a result of accruals 
that undergo reversal. This paper assumes that earnings are exceptionally low because the 
IPOs were not aware of the level of equilibrium of earnings management costs and 
revenues. 
3. Inferior return of sales (ROS) and return of assets (ROA) in post-earnings management 
periods. 
This paper assumes that when earnings are managed to a level that exceeds the level of 
equilibrium of costs and revenues, the accruals that undergo reversal, affect operating 
performance (ROS and ROA) in the periods after earnings management was used. Using ROS 
is consistent with Teoh et al. (1998) and Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007). Using ROA is 
consistent with Teoh et al. (1998). 
 
When earnings are highly in excess of operating cash flows (condition 1) this may indicate 
earnings management. However, to express a judgement about the degree of earnings 
management (e.g. strong, normal and weak income increasing), this paper uses the word 
“exceptionally”. It assumes that when earnings are exceptionally high in excess of 
operating cash flows strong income increasing earnings management is applied. This paper 
assumes that this strong level of earnings management is only applied when a firm is driven 
by self-interest, because when operating cash flows are exceptionally lower than earnings 
this can lead to liquidity problems. Liquidity problems may lead to misallocated capital 
and loss of financial prosperity (Schipper and Vincent 2003). The chance that a firm wants 
to express the real economic performance of the firm by strong upwardly managed 
earnings is small. 
 
Fan (2007) explained that IPOs only engage in earnings management when this expresses 
the real future performance of the firm. Because IPOs that meet condition 2 and 3 have 
inferior post-issue performance (measured by earnings in condition 2 and operational 
effectiveness ratios ROS and ROA in condition 3), earnings management did not reflect the 
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future performance. Hence, this paper assumes that these IPOs did not engage in earnings 
management to increase the informativeness of earnings. 
 
The three conditions are selected because they are all associated with costs and risks for 
IPOs and expose IPOs to several problems. For example, inferior post-issue performance 
caused by earnings management is associated with involuntary de-listing risks (Li et al. 
2006). To use these three conditions as proxies for opportunistic behaviour is consistent 
with some prior research, for example Teoh et al. (1998, 176) stated that: “A finding that 
accruals are unusually high in the IPO year, that post-IPO earnings are low, and that high 
IPO-year accruals predict low subsequent earnings would be consistent with the 
hypothesis of opportunism”. 
Several studies (Teoh et al. 1998; Fan 2007) pointed out that IPOs suffer a decline in the 
operating performance in post-IPO periods. Researchers try to explain this decline by 
examining the relationship with discretionary accruals. They stipulate that inferior post-
IPO operating performance occurs because discretionary accruals undergo reversal. Ahmad-
Zaluki et al. (2007) weakened this statement with their study on the Malaysian market. 
They only found weak evidence that earnings management by IPOs is associated with lower 
post-issue operating performance. The results of this paper regarding condition 3 are, 
besides to examine opportunistic behaviour, also used to give more insight in this debate. 
 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007, 30) found evidence that IPOs in Malaysia only engage in 
earnings management in times of economic stress (East Asia crisis). And Chen et al. (2005) 
found that firms with big four auditors engage less in earnings management compared to 
firms with non-big four auditors. Studies as these pointed out that the pervasiveness of 
earnings management depends on environmental and company-specific factors. A growing 
body of present papers strengthened this statement (Lewis 2007; Fan 2007). This paper will 
investigate if investor protection rules are a environmental factor that effect the extent of 
earnings management. And if the extent of opportunistic earnings management differ in 
countries with different investor protection regulations. To the authors best knowledge, 
are these investigations unique in the IPO context. 
 
2.3 Earnings management and investor protection 
Investor protection can be defined as “the protection of outside investors by the 
enforcement of regulations and laws”. (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002, stated in Boonlert-U-
Thai 2004, 7). Insiders have incentives to conceal the true performance of the firm by 
managing earnings to retain private control benefits. A private control benefit is, for 
example, consumption of the firms’ assets by other firms owned by managers. In general, 
the common aspect of private control benefits is that value is maintained by insiders and 
not shared with outside investors. Investors are protected by law and regulation to avoid 
this unfair distribution of value. They have opportunities to take disciplinary actions 
against the insiders, when they detect this unfair distribution. However, managers have 
the possibility to manage the degree and variability of earnings to mask the private control 
benefits. (Leuz et al. 2003, 2) 
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Leuz et al. (2003) investigated the level of earnings management in 31 countries in the 
world. They found that firms in countries with strong investor protection regulations 
engage in less earnings management, compared with firms in countries with weak investor 
protection regulations. Leuz et al. (2003, 21) stated that the reason for the lower level of 
earnings management is, that managers have less opportunities to retain private control 
benefits and therefore have fewer incentives to conceal the performance of the firm. This 
indicates that a strong level of protection limits insiders’ ability to expropriate values of 
the firm. Leuz et al. (2003, 21) concluded that their evidence highlight an important 
relationship between the quality of earnings and investor protection. The findings of Leuz 
et al. (2003, 21) are strengthened by evidence of other papers, for example Boonlert-U-Tai 
(2004). 
 
Firms can use their discretion to increase the informativeness of earnings. Leuz et al. 
(2003, 9) stipulated that this may be the result of effective investor protection regulations 
and therefore may not apply to firms in countries with weak investor protection 
regulations. They stated that firms in poor investor protection countries have more 
possibilities to manage earnings more aggressive, compared with strong investor protection 
countries. However, they have not examined this. This paper contributes to such further 
research and examines if there is a positive relationship between weak investor protection 
regulations and opportunistic behavior. 
 
In the literature are several indexes for the level of investor protection regulations 
available. Leuz et al. (2003) used the index of La Porta et al. (1998), which is based on the 
rules in the nineties. Several researchers have criticised this index (Djankov et al. 2008) 
and this paper chooses therefore a new and more recent index: the investor protection 
index of Djankov et al. (2008). They presented an index that measures the extent in which 
shareholders are protected against expropriation by firms insiders. Their index is composed 
with the help of Lex Mundi law firms and is based on the rules prevailed in 2003. 
 
 
3. Hypothesis development and research design 
 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
This paper first examines if significantly positive discretionary accruals are present in year 
-1, 0 or +1, and if they undergo reversal in year +2 and become negative. To examine the 
robustness of the results of the discretionary accruals, this paper performs a re-weighting 
procedure with outliers (e.g. if discretionary accruals are still present when outliers are 
eliminated), which is also used by Roosenboom et al. (2003, 20). And it uses a control 
group to compare discretionary accruals of this group with those of the sample group. This 
procedure is consistent with Bajor (2002, 41). 
 
After these two robustness checks this paper examines the three conditions for 
opportunistic behaviour. First if there is a positive relationship between significantly 
positive discretionary accruals, and exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash 
flow in the same year. Second if there is a positive relationship between earnings of IPOs 
 34 
with significantly positive discretionary accruals, and negative discretionary accruals and 
exceptionally low earnings in post-earnings management periods. And third if there is a 
positive relationship between significantly positive discretionary accruals that undergo 
reversal and become negative, and inferior operating performance in later periods. Finally, 
this paper examines if there is a positive relationship between earnings management, 
opportunistic behaviour specifically, and low investor protection regulations. 
 
3.2 Sample selection and data 
The original sample consists 4,563 IPO observations from 31 countries in the period 2001 
till 2004 (4 years). The IPO observations are obtained from the Thomson One Banker 
database. The countries are selected for two reasons: 1) all countries have an sufficient 
number of IPOs in the selected period (more than 10) and 2) neither of these countries 
suffer hyperinflation in the sample period, which strongly affect earnings management 
measures (Leuz et al. 2003, 10). The sample period is chosen because: 1) it is not 
overlapping with prior research, 2) the investor protection index is based on the legal rules 
prevailing in the year 2003 and therefore usabe to the sample period, and 3) the sample 
period avoids the dot-com bubble (1995 till the spring of 2001). The following firms are 
excluded: 1,048 firms with no Sedol number available, 1,035 secondary equity offerings, 
639 financial and insurance companies, 304 issuers of non-ordinary and non-common 
shares, 55 regulated utility firms, 2 privatization’s of state-owned enterprises and 968 
firms with incomplete financial data. To exclude these groups is consistent with prior IPO 
research (Teoh et al. 1998; Roosenboom et al. 2003), which makes comparisons with other 
papers’ results more reliable, and the sample group reaches more homogeneity. The final 
sample consist 512 IPOs from 24 different countries9, spread across all industries. 
 
Accruals are measured through accrual estimating models. This paper uses two models 
which enhances the robustness of the results (Xiong 2006, 219). Different models are 
evaluated for this research and the performance adjusted models advised by Kothari et al. 
(2005, 195) are chosen10. Kothari et al. (2005, 195) found that the best measures of 
discretionary accruals (with the lowest type I and type II errors), can be achieved using the 
Jones (1991) model or the Modified Jones (1995) model adjusted for a performance 
adjusted firm’s discretionary accrual. For the performance adjustment process this paper 
uses the sort of industry and the ROA, which is advised by Kothari (2005, 165). This paper 
uses the cross-sectional regression analysis and it includes a constant term in the functions 
of the models. There are in total 2,048 IPO year observations (512 IPOs times 4 years). The 
matching process to obtain control firms for the performance adjusted models starts, 
consistent with Kothari et al. (2005, 173), at the Two digit SIC code level. This means that 
                                             
9 The countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
10 In this study the Modified Jones (1995) model with ROA as an additional regressor, is also selected and used 
to determine discretionary accruals. But there were striking results when comparing the models´ results 
with the other two models, and between the results of the sample and the control group of this model. This 
paper gives no outline of these results and interprets the results as an indication that the model is fairly 
ineffective. 
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each IPO year observation is matched with a control firm in the same country, with the 
same Two digit SIC code level and with the closest ROA in the same year. If the percentage 
difference of the ROA between the IPO and the control firm is more than 20%, the 
matching process is moved to the One digit SIC classification, which is consistent with 
Singer (2006, 12) and Fan (2007, 15). This matching procedure is able to obtain close 
matches for most of the IPO year observations: for 1,054 IPO year observations of the 
Performance adjusted Jones (1991) model discretionary accruals and for 1,055 of the 
Modified Jones (1995) version. The majority of the IPO year observations have a ROA of not 
more than 5% difference with the control firms in the same year. 
 
3.3 Accrual estimating models 
The estimating procedure for accruals is as follows. The first step is to measure total 
accruals using the Jones (1991) definition, which defines total accruals as the difference 
between earnings and operating cash flows. These are calculated by the following formula: 
 
TA τ  =  (NIτ – CFC τ) / Aτ -1            (equation 1) 
Where: 
TA           =   total accruals in year τ 
NIτ           =   net income in year τ 
CFCτ           =   cash flows from operations in year τ 
Aτ-1           =   total assets at τ-1 
 
The second step is to measure non-discretionary accruals. The formula for the 
Performance adjusted Jones (1991) model is as follows: 
 
NDAτ   =  α0 + α1 (1/Aτ-1) + α2 (ΔREVτ) + α3 (PPEτ)    (2) 
Where: 
NDAτ           =   non-discretionary accruals in year τ  
ΔREVτ           =   revenues in year τ less revenues in year τ-1 scaled by total assets at τ-1 
PPEτ           =   gross property plant and equipment in year τ scaled by total assets at τ-1 
α0, α1, α2, α3  =   firm-specific parameters 
 
The firm-specific parameters, α0, α1, α2, α3 are obtained from a linear cross-sectional 
regression of financial information from the control group. The model of this regression 
analyses is: 
 
TAτ  = a0 + a1 (1/A τ-1) + a2 (ΔREVτ) + a3 (PPEτ)     (3) 
 
Were a0, a1, a2 and a3 are the ordinary least squares (OLS) of α0, α1, α2 and α3. 
 
For the Performance adjusted Modified Jones (1995) model the formula for non-
discretionary accruals accruals is: 
 
NDAτ   =  α0 + α1 (1/Aτ-1) + α2 (ΔREVτ – ΔRECτ) + α3 (PPEτ)   (4) 
 
 36 
ΔRECτ stands for the net receivables in year τ minus the net receivables in year τ-1 scaled 
by total assets at τ-1. The other variables represent the same variables as in the 
Performance adjusted Jones (1991) model. 
 
The next step is to determine discretionary accruals (DA) by the following formula: 
 
DAτ  =  TAτ – NDAτ         (5) 
 
Te final step is to subtract discretionary accruals of the control firm from those of the 
sample firm. Hence, the formula is for the Performance adjusted Jones (1991) and 
Modified Jones (1995) model discretionary accruals (DA) is: 
 
DAτ  =  SampleDAτ – ControlDAτ       (6) 
 
 
5 Results and analysis 
 
5.1 Indications of earnings management  
A Paired-Sample T Test is used to determine if discretionary accruals (from equation 6) are 
significantly positive. The level of statistical significance is 0.05% or lower and the level of 
statistical reliability is 95%. The tests give no significantly positive discretionary accruals 
among the firms that issued an IPO in the years 2001 and 2002. For the other two years the 
tests show consistent evidence that significantly positive discretionary accruals are present 
in year 0 of firms that issued an IPO in 2003, and in year +1 of firms that issued an IPO in 
2004. The results are robust to additional tests, of which figure 2 gives an example. This 
figure shows that discretionary accruals of the control group (not performance adjusted) in 
year 0, are 0.06 lower than that of the sample group (performance adjusted). For issuing 
year 2004 the accruals of the control group in year +1 are significantly negative (-0.02), 
while those of the sample group are significantly positive (0.06). The results of the 
Performance adjustment Jones (1991) model give consistent results. In addition, for both 
models count that in 2003 and 2004 significantly positive discretionary accruals undergo 
reversal in year +2 and become negative. 
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Figure 2 - Comparison of discretionary accruals between the sample and the control group 
 
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash flow 
Accruals of year 0 of issuing year 2003 and year +1 of issuing year 2004 are separated into 
different quintiles. The quintile with the lowest discretionary accruals is called quintile 5 
the “conservative quintile”. The quintile with the highest is called quintile 1 the 
“aggressive quintile”. This procedure is consistent with Teoh et al. (1998). Figure 3 shows 
that quintile 1 and 2 have high significantly positive discretionary accruals in year 0. 
Average earnings of IPOs in quintile 1 are $ 5,483 million positive in year 0, operating cash 
flows are $ 2,376 million negative. Earnings in quintile 2 are $ 3,816 million positive in 
year 0; a grown of 73% compared with the prior year. Operating cash flows decreases with 
28% to a level of $ 3,965 million. The figure shows that in both quintiles 1 and 2 are 
exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash flow and thus are the IPOs in these 
quintiles, under suspicion of opportunistic earnings management. Earnings in the other 
quintiles do not grow in excess of operating cash flow and are not under suspicion of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
The results for the year 2004 indicate that the median earnings of quintile 1 is $ 2,094 
million positive in year +1 (a reduction of 10% compared to year 0) while operating cash 
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flows in this year is $ 920 million negative (a reduction of 277%). The statistics of quintile 1 
show indications that firms increase earnings in excess of operating cash flows, to prevent 
earnings from a great reduction. This is consistent with the opportunistic perspective. The 
other quintiles have no exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash flow. 
 
Figure 3 - Discretionary accruals, earnings and operating cash flows of IPOs from 2003 
 
Mean discretionary 
accruals 
Mean earnings per million    
dollar 
Mean op. cashflow per million 
dollar 
Earnings 
management in 
year 0 of firms 
that issued IPO in 
2003 -1 0 +1 +2 -1 0 +1 +2 -1 0 +1 +2 
5,604  5,483  7,589  -81  7,351  -2,376  9,187  5,136  
  -2% 38% -101%   -132% 487% -44% 
Quintile 1 most 
aggressive 
-0.22* 0.37* -0.03* -0.20*
      -101%       316% 
2,208  3,816  5,750  2,806  5,505  3,965  9,453  6,902  
  73% 51% -51%   -28% 138% -27% Quintile 2 -0.06 0.12*  -0.02  -0.01*
      -26%       74% 
4,553  4,658  2,892  2,892  4,367  5,815  5,563  5,841  
  2% -38% 0,0%   33% -4% 5% Quintile 3 -0.24* 0.02  0.00  -0.05 
      -38%       0% 
7,272  6,768  5,477  3,568  4,475  14,840  7,953  15,267 
  -7% -19% -35%   232% -46% 92% Quintile 4 -0.06 -0.06* -0.08* -0.01*
      -47%       3% 
5,386  6,674  5,578  3,814  5,328  13,543  4,834  10,615 
  24% -16% -32%   154% -64% 120% 
Quintile 5 most 
conservative 
-0.32* -0.20* 
 
-0.07* -0.04 
      -43%       -22% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note : there are more or less 25 IPOs in each year in each quintile (containing IPO year 
observations from both performance adjusted models). 
 
5.3 Exceptionally low future earnings 
Figure 3 shows that in quintile 1 a positive relationship between earnings of IPOs with 
positive discretionary accruals, and negative discretionary accruals and exceptionally low 
earnings in post-IPO periods is present. Earnings become $ 81 million negative and accruals 
undergo reversal in year +2. Firms within this quintile seem to have crossed the level of 
equilibrium, since earnings did not express the real future performance. For the year 2004 
earnings management is pronounced in year +1 but in year +2 there are no exceptionally 
low future earnings. Because there is no information available for later periods than year 
+2 it is difficult to interpret the results, since it is possible that earnings will decline in 
year +3. 
 
Key to symbols: 
- The difference between year +1 and +2 
- The difference between year +0 and +2 
- *: discretionary accruals are  
   significant 
- Bold: important figure 
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5.4 Inferior post-earnings management operating performance 
 To rule out the possibility that poor performance is a general problem and not explicit 
related with IPOs, this paper tests if the post-issue operating performances of IPOs is 
inferior compared to non-issuers. Figure 4 presents the ROS and ROA of the sample group 
of issuing year 2003 and 2004. Consistent with some prior studies (Teoh et al. 1998; 
Roosenboom et al. 2003) there is evidence of inferior post-issue operating performance by 
issuing firms. While the operating performance of non-issuing firms remains at a constant 
level, for IPOs it declines in post-issuing years 2004, 2005 and 2006 and stays behind. 
 
Figure 4 - The operating performance of issuers and non-issuers 
 
 
  
          
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The number of IPO year observations of firms that issued IPO in 2003 is 506, and for 
2004 1,150 (containing IPO year observations from both performance adjusted models). 
 
Figure 5 presents the ROS and ROA for firms that issued IPO in 2003 and 2004 sorted per 
quintile. The results show that both ROS and ROA of quintile 1 of IPOs from 2003 undergo 
an exceptional decline. This quintile presents a decline in ROS from year 0 to year +2 of -
128%. ROS becomes 0.03 negative in year +2, while ROS of the other quintiles remains 
 40 
positive. ROA declines by -69% from year 0 to year +2 to a level of 3.39. The other quintiles 
have a maximum decline in ROA of -57% from year 0 to +2 (quintile 5) and a minimum ROA 
of 5.13 (quintile 4). Quintile 2 seems to decline “normal” compared to the other quintiles; 
a decline from year 0 to year +2 of -25% in ROS and -32% in ROA. It seems that quintile 1 
has both accruals that undergo reversal and, compared with the other quintiles, 
exceptionally inferior post-earnings management operating performance. 
 
ROS of quintile 1 of IPOs from 2004 decline to a level of 0.02 in year +2, which is 
considerable low compared to the other quintiles. Quintile 2 has the highest ROS of 0.06 
and quintile 4 and 5 have a ROS of 0.03. ROA of quintile 1 declines to 2.05 which is again 
low compared with the other quintiles. ROA of quintile 2 is also low with 2.41, however, 
ROS is the highest of all quintiles with 0.06. The results are consistent with those of firms 
that issued IPO in 2003, namely that quintile 1 has both accruals that undergo reversal 
and, compared with the other quintiles, exceptionally inferior post-earnings management 
operating performance. There is thus a positive relationship between significantly positive 
discretionary accruals that undergo reversal and become negative, and inferior operating 
performance in later periods, in quintile 1 of both 2003 and 2004 IPOs. IPOs in other 
quintiles have also inferior post-earnings management operating performance, but not so 
exceptionally high than quintile 1. A possible reason that the other quintiles, without the 
presence of opportunistic behaviour, also have poorer performances on the long run, could 
be that these IPOs have time their offering in a period of peak performance, which could 
not stand in the long run (Fan 2007, 21). 
 
Figure 5 - Discretionary accruals, earnings and operating cash flows sorted per quintile 
 
 
Mean return of sales in % Mean return of assets in % Firms that issued 
IPO in 2003 -1 0 1 2 -1 0 1 2 
0.12  0.10  0.06  -0.03   16.08  10.84  8.81  3.39  
  -19% -33% -142%   -33% -19% -62% 
Quintile 1 most 
aggressive 
      -128%       -69% 
0.04  0.06  0.06  0.04  6.43  7.99  7.39  5.40  
  46% 11% -32%   24% -7% -27% Quintile 2 
      -25%       -32% 
0.07  0.08  0.04  0.05  10.34  9.08  7.47  5.40  
  18% -47% 11%   -12% -18% -28% Quintile 3 
      -41%       -41% 
0.14  0.12  0.08  0.04  12.19  9.94  8.31  5.13  
  -18% -35% -45%   -18% -16% -38% Quintile 4 
      -64%       -48% 
0.12  0.13  0.09  0.06  14.26  12.22  8.11  5.26  
  8% -33% -31%   -14% -34% -35% 
Quintile 5 most 
conservative 
      -54%       -57% 
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Note: the key to symbols and the number of IPOs per quintile are the same as in figure 3. 
 
5.5 Opportunistic earnings management 
This paper finds a positive relationship between significantly positive discretionary 
accruals and exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash flow, in quintile 1 and 
2 of firms that issued an IPO in the year 2003, and in quintile 1 of firms that issued IPO in 
2004. The results also indicate that only firms in quintile 1 of IPO year 2003 have 
underperforming future earnings, and herewith could properly not have managed their 
earnings to the level of equilibrium. And third, despite inferior post-issue operating 
performance is pronounced for the complete sample of IPOs, there is only evidence of a 
positive relationship between exceptionally inferior post-earnings management operating 
performance and discretionary accruals that undergo reversal, in the most aggressive 
quintiles. This paper interprets the results of these three tests, that only the IPOs in the 
most aggressive quintiles of both issuing year 2003 and year 2004, meet the conditions 
outlined in section 2 and are thus under suspicion of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
The IPOs that are under suspicion of opportunistic behaviour represents more or less 20% of 
the firms that issued IPO in 2003 and 2004. And more or less 10% of the total sample (4 
years). Among others, Teoh et al. (1998) and Roosenboom et al. (2003) found higher 
percentages and concluded that opportunistic behaviour is strongly pronounced among 
IPOs. The results of this paper challenge this traditional view and add evidence to support 
the more recent view (Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Fan 2007) that the appearance of 
discretionary accruals is not a result of managerial opportunism, but appear because they 
are endogenous to IPOs. The results suggest that the information perspective on earnings 
management is more pronounced. 
 
A recommendation for further research is to examine the negative effects of opportunistic 
behaviour behaviour for investors. For example if investors are aware that it is used to 
Median return of sales in % Median return of assets in % Firms that issued 
IPO in 2004 -1 0 1 2 -1 0 1 2 
0.10  0.05  0.03  0.02  10.78  12.15  8.70  2.05  
  -53% -25% -30%   13% -28% -76% 
Quintile 1 most 
aggressive 
      -47%       -83% 
0.10  0.08  0.05  0.06  -0.02  5.68  4.92  2.41  
  -20% -45% 35%    -13% -51% Quintile 2 
      -25%       -58% 
0.08  0.08  0.03  0.05  2.19  7.69  6.89  6.19  
  -1% -65% 82%   251% -10% -10% Quintile 3 
      -36%       -20% 
0.09  0.05  0.05  0.03  5.19  8.25  4.12  3.64  
  -43% -5% -37%   59% -50% -12% Quintile 4 
      -40%       -56% 
0.05  0.03  0.02  0.03  2.74  5.30  0.66  4.02  
  -41% -35% 67%   93% -87% 506% 
Quintile 5 most 
conservative 
      9%       -24% 
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manipulate them. And when they are aware, if they make adjustments in the stock value 
or alternatively, that the costs of opportunistic behaviour are too small that a change of 
behaviour is necessary. Also the implications of informative earnings management for both 
the firm and investors, is a subject that demands more research. For example if investors 
upwardly adjust the firms’ value, when they realise that discretionary accruals are used to 
inform them instead of manipulating them. An other recommendation for future research 
is the effect of conservative accounting on future earnings and operating performance. 
This paper, and most other prior earnings management research, mainly focus on the 
relationship with aggressively accounting. 
 
5.6 Discretionary accruals and investor protection regulations 
The total sample consists of 512 firms in 24 countries worldwide (on 25 stock markets). 
The country with the highest investor protection measure is Singapore with a rate of 9.3, 
the lowest is Greece with a rate of 3.0. The tests show, consistent with Leuz et al. (2003), 
that discretionary accruals are higher in low investor protection countries. Those of the 
medium investor protection regulations are positive but less so than those of low investor 
protection regulations. Discretionary accruals of the high investor protection regulations 
are almost equal to zero or negative. The next step is to analyse the relationship between 
different discretionary accruals quintiles and investor protection regulations. The results 
are outlined in figure 6. IPOs from issuing year 2003 are sorted in two investor protection 
groups and IPOs from issuing year 2004 in three groups. When strong investor protection 
regulations would counter opportunistic behaviour, the expectation is that there are 
exceptionally more IPOs in low investor protection countries in quintile 1 compared to 
quintile 5. An other expectation is that there is a gradually descending line, from many 
IPOs in low investor protection regulations in quintile 1 to less in quintile 5. Figure 6 shows 
that in quintile 1 of issuing year 2003 there in more or less an equal number of IPOs in 
weak investor protection countries, as there is in quintile 5. And there are more IPOs in 
strong countries than there are in quintile 5. Issuing year 2004 shows no gradually 
descending line. For example, the number of weak investor protection countries declines 
in quintile 2 compared with quintile 1, but rises again in quintile 4. And the number of 
medium investor protection countries rises in quintile 2 compared with quintile 1, but 
declines again in quintile 4. This paper interprets these statistics that evidence for a 
positive relationship between weak investor protection regulations and opportunistic 
earnings management is far from unequivocal. This seems to be consistent with most IPO 
research that found evidence of opportunistic earnings management in high investor 
protection countries (for example in the U.S.). It seems that investor protection rules have 
their limits which prevent opportunistic earnings management in the context of IPOs. 
Because this conclusion is only based on one observation, more research is necessary to see 
whether it is generalisable. 
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Figure 6 - The distribution of investor protection regulations per discretionary accruals 
quintile 
 
 
      
 
      
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
 
6 Summary and conclusions 
Based on a sample of 512 companies in 24 countries worldwide, and using better accrual 
estimating models and a more recent sample than most prior research, this paper first 
argues that IPOs do engage in earnings management. However, it seems that earnings 
management is less pronounced than prior research has suggested (Teoh et al. 1998; 
Roosenboom et al. 2003), because earnings management is only found in two of the four 
issuing years. These results show that both investors and standard setters should interpret 
results of prior research with care. 
 
Second, based on three selected conditions there are indications that the use of earnings 
management is driven by self-interest. But because IPOs that are under suspicion of such 
behaviour only represent a small proportion of the total sample (+-10%), this paper adds 
more evidence to the recent view (Ball and Shivakumar 2006), that the appearance of 
discretionary accruals is not a result of managerial opportunism, but occurs because 
discretionary accruals are endogenous to IPOs. The results challenges the opportunistic 
perspective on earnings management and suggest that the information perspective on 
earnings management is more pronounced. 
Third, the results show that strong aggressively managed earnings by IPOs, “predict” 
excessively lower future earnings and inferior post-issue operating performance. On the 
other hand, there is little evidence for this relationship in situations of less aggressively 
managed earnings. 
 
At last, in continuation of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) who advised for further investigations 
about company and environmental factors, the results of this paper add to the growing 
body of evidence that  the pervasiveness of earnings management depends on these 
factors. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between low investor 
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protection regulations and earnings management: discretionary accruals are, on average, 
higher for countries with low investor protection regulations. However, no positive 
relationship is signalled between opportunistic behaviour and low investor protection 
regulations. It seems that stronger enforcement of investor protection laws do not counter 
opportunistic behaviour. Therefore should investors not rely on investor protection rules 
excessively, when investing in an IPO. This conclusion complements the findings of Leuz et 
al. (2003, 9). 
 
The relevance of these results can be summarised as follows. First, the results show that 
earnings management, opportunistic behaviour specifically, can be very costly and can be 
predicted by discretionary accruals around the IPO process. This helps issuing firms about 
how discretionary accruals affect the post-issue performance and affect the cost of equity. 
Second, accounting standard setters and regulators who are interested in earnings 
management behaviour, see that care must be exercised in interpreting the effectiveness 
of investor protection rules with respect to opportunistic behaviour. They may re-consider 
their laws and regulations to make them more effective. And finally, investors and other 
stakeholders notice that earnings management is not all-pervasive. And in situations that it 
is present, it is far from unequivocal that it is used to manipulate accounting figures. 
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